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	<title>Comments on: Math Gets Around: Politics</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html</link>
	<description>Ruminations on the Intersection Between Mathematics and Popular Culture</description>
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		<title>By: Sandy</title>
		<link>http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html/comment-page-1#comment-9</link>
		<dc:creator>Sandy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 20:51:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>What about the political strategy of campaigning in those states with the most electoral votes.  Has a one of the candidates hired you to do some mathematical modeling to reflect where they should be campaigning?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What about the political strategy of campaigning in those states with the most electoral votes.  Has a one of the candidates hired you to do some mathematical modeling to reflect where they should be campaigning?</p>
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		<title>By: Matt</title>
		<link>http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html/comment-page-1#comment-8</link>
		<dc:creator>Matt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 20:18:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html#comment-8</guid>
		<description>hey Mike,&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;you&#039;re right - Arrow&#039;s theorem only applies to partially ordered systems.  You can give a ranking of your preferences from best to least, but this ranking doesn&#039;t allow you to quantify how strong you feel about your individual choices.  this is the freedom that range voting allows you.  perhaps this posting will require a followup at some later date.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>hey Mike,</p>
<p>you&#8217;re right &#8211; Arrow&#8217;s theorem only applies to partially ordered systems.  You can give a ranking of your preferences from best to least, but this ranking doesn&#8217;t allow you to quantify how strong you feel about your individual choices.  this is the freedom that range voting allows you.  perhaps this posting will require a followup at some later date.</p>
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		<title>By: Mike</title>
		<link>http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html/comment-page-1#comment-7</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 20:11:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html#comment-7</guid>
		<description>Hey Matt -- hope you&#039;re having fun in LA!  I found your blog from Gabe&#039;s link, and as I&#039;m currently procrastinating on some research, here&#039;s a though.  If I remember correctly, Arrow&#039;s theorem only applies to preference orderings, so more expressive ballots might allow you to bypass it.  In particular, at some point I saw a talk on &lt;a HREF=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Range_voting&quot; REL=&quot;nofollow&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;range voting&lt;/a&gt; which I think has all of the nice properties you mentioned, but allows people to assign numerical scores to candidates instead of just ranking them.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey Matt &#8212; hope you&#8217;re having fun in LA!  I found your blog from Gabe&#8217;s link, and as I&#8217;m currently procrastinating on some research, here&#8217;s a though.  If I remember correctly, Arrow&#8217;s theorem only applies to preference orderings, so more expressive ballots might allow you to bypass it.  In particular, at some point I saw a talk on <a HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Range_voting" REL="nofollow" rel="nofollow">range voting</a> which I think has all of the nice properties you mentioned, but allows people to assign numerical scores to candidates instead of just ranking them.</p>
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		<title>By: Megancake</title>
		<link>http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html/comment-page-1#comment-6</link>
		<dc:creator>Megancake</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 03:06:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.mathgoespop.com/2008/07/math-gets-around-politics.html#comment-6</guid>
		<description>you lost me at &quot;chief&quot; :)&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;kisses!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>you lost me at &#8220;chief&#8221; :)</p>
<p>kisses!</p>
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